Culture and Identity: Some Borneo Comparisons

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Abstract

In an attempt to promote a wide-ranging comparative investigation in Borneo Studies and one which looks beyond Borneo’s shores to the wider nation-states in which Sarawak, Sabah and Kalimantan are situated, this paper examines the interrelated concepts of culture and identity, and more especially identities in motion, in analysing interrelationships and encounters between a range of peoples and communities. Although it is an attempt to re-orient and promote the study of Bornean identities what it is doing in a more modest fashion is to bring some of the available literature together and explore some of the links between case-studies and ideas. The cases are grouped under four heads (though as the research develops there could be more) whilst keeping in mind the underlying concepts of centres and margins and cores and peripheries: (1) the nation-state, majorities and minorities; (2) the media, identities and nation-building; (3) borderlands, margins and identities; and (4) emerging middle classes, lifestyles and identities.

Keywords

Identity, identities in motion, ethnicity, culture, centres and margins, Borneo.
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This paper integrates a very long narrative with a power point presentation which was delivered at the Borneo Research Council conference at Universiti Brunei Darussalam on 26 June 2012. The images have only a tenuous connection with the narrative. They are displayed not to elaborate on or explicate a particular argument, but merely to demonstrate that the anthropologist as well as those we study (and those we don’t) construct identities, classifications and stereotypes. We do so in our ethnographies and we do so in photograph and film. In my view the images here require no explanation. They were captured by the author in moments from 1972 to 2012 among the Embaloh, Palin, Taman and Iban peoples of the Upper Kapuas (1972-73), Iban in Sarawak in the mid-1980s, items of material culture (1970s and 1980s) and most recently in a Rungus Dusun tourist longhouse in Kudat (2012); whether this was an exercise in presenting the exotic then the reader has to judge for himself/herself; it is certainly an attempt to apprehend what we might term 'otherness'. There are also images taken from the colonial era by Hendrik Freerk Tillema in East Kalimantan; he has constructed another kind of identity and one which could be considered to be highly problematic in the modern nation-state of Indonesia (1989). Yet Tillema’s photographs are wonderfully evocative images of vibrant cultures in the Apo Kayan area of central and eastern Borneo as they were in the 1930s; they deserve to be displayed and enjoyed for what they are. In reading this paper we have to keep in mind constantly the processes which give rise to identities and how they are sustained and transformed.
Preamble: background to the study

A few years ago I completed a book entitled *The Sociology of Southeast Asia. Transformations in a Developing Region* (2008a). I had been engaged in this project on and off for some years, but as it progressed, it became very clear to me that there is a very substantial literature in what can appropriately be labelled the sociology of culture, which I could not include in that volume. This has emerged especially from the 1980s with the increasing interest in ‘posts’: post-modernism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, post-Orientalism and the multidisciplinary enterprise of cultural studies and its preoccupations with the dramatic and expanding impact of the global media and information technology on developing societies, with the Foucault-Derrida-Lacan-derived relationship between power and knowledge, with the all-consuming passion among increasing numbers of people for consumption in late capitalism, and the enormous opportunities for cross-cultural encounters in diasporas, international labour migration, business travel and tourism (Jenks, 1993: 136-158; and see Clammer, 2002: 9-12; Goh, 2002: 21-28; Kahn, 1995; and Turner, 1990). To gain a flavour of the tortuous nature of post-structuralist or post-colonialist debates and the problems of applying Western theories to Asian cultures then we need go no further than Peter Jackson’s penetrating work on Thai culture and his encounters with post-structuralists like Rosalind Morris (see, for example, 2004, 2005).
In Southeast Asia specifically these cultural interests have flourished in the recent concerns among social scientists with what I have still tended to refer to in rather traditonalist mode as ‘ethnicity’ (see King and Wilder, 1982, 2003), and with what has come to be called increasingly and in a much more expanded and all-encompassing cultural studies sense ‘identity’ or ‘cultural identity’ (see, for example, Kahn, 1998). It has also been examined within the field of ‘cultural politics’ in the context of the encounter between the nation-state and some of its constituent populations, frequently minorities or those at the margins of the state. Zawawi Ibrahim has also made the very useful distinction between ‘representation’ and ‘identity’ in his interrogation of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘intercultural fluidity’ in Sarawak and in his examination of the construction and transformation of identities (and ethnicities) and the representation of ‘the other’ in terms of ‘grand-narratives’ (‘development’, ‘modernisation’, ‘modernity’) as well as in relation to the policies, actions and discourse of those responsible for the governing, management and development of the nation-state (2008a: 1-19; 2008b).

Let me for a moment return to the ‘posts’. Perhaps the reader can already sense that I have not been a great fan of post-modernism and post-structuralism, though for present purposes I have needed to steel myself and plunge into what is often, for me at least, an occasionally rewarding yet decidedly turgid and dense literature. It frequently requires the same kind of efforts of translation into simple and straightforward English which C. Wright Mills undertook on behalf of Talcott Parsons (the latter’s style of exposition I have always referred to as the ‘Parsonian jungle’ and that of the post-modernists and post-structuralists is often equally luxuriant and impenetrable) (Mills, 1959: 25-33). Stanislav Andrewsski makes the same point about the dense and unfathomable language adopted by senior sociologists and their acolytes in his characterisation of social science ‘as sorcery’ (1972). As an example, and though James Goodman is by no means the worst offender and I have selected him at random in my general reading of material on globalisation, I refer you to the concluding two pages of his chapter on ‘the new inequalities’ in Asia Pacific where we find ‘reciprocal and reflexive mobilisations’, ‘resistance identities’, ‘the capacity to reground the public realm’, ‘transformative project identities’, ‘liberal hegemonism’, ‘transversal solidarity’, disrupting disembedded liberalism’, ‘alternative normative foundations’, and ‘an enveloping politicisation of hegemonism and the agents of new constitutionalism’ (2003:46-47). I doubt that most of our undergraduates would begin to comprehend this barrage of dense and concentrated concepts, and frankly, I also struggle with them with little intellectual profit.

For my first general sociology book on Southeast Asia the publishers had set me a demanding word limit which I was not permitted to exceed. Therefore, I began ruthlessly to excise large amounts of material on culture and identity which I had originally included in what was to be my attempt at an encyclopaedic volume of regional sociology. Instead I decided to focus on political, economic and historical perspectives in trying to come to grips with social change in Southeast Asia rather than explore the cultural dimensions of change. Although I managed to devote a chapter to ‘Ethnicity and Society’ and another on the ‘Asian values’ debate, as well as addressing in summary fashion identities in the context of changing class, gender and urban relations in my first volume, I was unable to devote sufficient attention to a comparative study of the development and transformation of complex and shifting identities across Southeast Asia. In particular I tended to postpone any sustained consideration of the burgeoning literature on the effects of and responses to globalisation, consumerism, the media, migrations and tourist encounters. It seemed
to me that my lack of attention to these areas of sociological interest, which was certainly a conscious choice, though in the circumstances an unavoidable one, was the most unsatisfactory aspect of my excursion into the general field of Southeast Asian sociology. It is a disjuncture which Postill also remarks upon in the Sarawak context with the ‘cleavage between culture and political economy’ (2006: 45). I fully accept the very sensible case which has been made in a Southeast Asian and wider Asian context for the integration of perspectives from cultural studies with political economy analyses, though I do not undertake this task here (Clammer, 2002: 11). The concern to locate cultural studies, following Stuart Hall, within the histories and legacies of colonialism in the post-1945 world is also well taken (Morley and Chen, 1996: 10-13).

**Significant influences**

The opportunity to remedy this omission of culture and identity from my general excursions into the complexities of Southeast Asian social and cultural change is still in process in that I am two-thirds of the way through writing a book which I call *Identities in Motion: the Sociology of Cultural Change in Southeast Asia*. A previous concept of ‘identities in motion’ devised by Chandrima Chatterjee (2006) is rather different in focus and orientation than mine in that Chatterjee is concerned with the health risks suffered by migrants in India in relation to human rights issues and therefore with the movement of identities in a physical sense, whereas I am primarily concerned with the construction, flux, change and movement in cultural identities themselves. I offer here some preliminary thoughts on what I am now referring to as the sociology of culture, and, in returning to my Borneo roots, which are deeply embedded but which have not produced much in the way of any promising vegetal growth during the past ten years or so, I thought I would also try to say something useful in this context about some recent comparative work which I have been examining on Borneo. My current concerns cover the whole of the Southeast Asian region, but I do refer to some case-material on Borneo, all of it from published or internet sources, though I find it difficult to bring this rather disparate material into any coherent, all-embracing framework. I should also add that, despite my absence from Borneo studies, I have managed to stay in touch with this field of studies by continuing my reflections on or at least trying to make sense of my past work on Borneo (see, for example King, 2009a), in keeping abreast of the literature in the pleasurable exercise of reviewing books on Borneo (see, for example, King, 2006) and in examining relevant doctoral theses (most recently those by Lars Kaskija, Henry Chan, Poline Bala, John Postill, Fausto Barlocco, Hjh. Asiyah Az-Zahra Hj Ahmad Kumpoh, Maureen de Silva, and Fiona Harris).

In what is for me a relatively new foray into the mysteries of ‘media worlds’ and culture I am especially grateful for the guidance of Dr John Postill whose work in the field of media anthropology with reference to Malaysia and the Iban of Sarawak I much admire. He kindly sent me a complimentary copy of his book *Media and Nation Building. How the Iban became Malaysian* (2006) which emerged in heavily revised form from a doctoral thesis which he had presented in the University of London in 2000; I had read the thesis as external examiner. It helped me enormously in finding my way through some of the relevant literature and in focusing some of my thoughts, particularly on the relationship between the media, culture and nation-building. His statement that Malaysia and other new states ‘are best understood not as imagined communities (Anderson 1991) but rather as culture areas hosting open networks of social
formations …..cultural forms ….and exchange systems’ had particular resonance for me in my search for the cultural dimension in Southeast Asia (2006: 197). This influence was further consolidated a few years ago when I examined the study of Fausto Barlocco, co-supervised by John Postill, entitled Between the local and the state: practices and discourses of identity among the Kadazan of Sabah (East Malaysia) (2008) a PhD thesis presented to the University of Loughborough (and see Barlocco, 2009, 2010). Barlocco considers some of the responses of the Kadazandusun of the Penampang district of Sabah to nation-building in Malaysia and to media-generated and disseminated messages about Malaysian identities.

I am also grateful to Professor Mark Hobart who, through the kind offices of John Postill, sent John (and me) a list of his publications on Bali. I had long been acquainted with Mark Hobart’s work from his early excursions, along with his co-researcher Dr Felicia Hughes-Freeland, into Balinese television but I had not really given it the attention it deserves. I have also long been an enthusiastic supporter of the work of Professors Krisna Sen and Philip Kitley who have done much to advance the study of the media in Indonesia and who kindly contributed to a conference on ‘Images of the Malay-Indonesian World’ which Michael Hitchcock and I, among many others, organised at the University of Hull in July 1993. It was this conference and the edited book which emerged from it which more than anything else sparked off a more sustained and considered interest in the study of ‘ethnicities’ and ‘identities’ (Hitchcock and King, 1997a, 1997b; and see Hall, 1997, 2000).

I should also mention two close friends in Malaysia who have been working in fields which are relevant to my current enterprise and who most generously offered me the opportunity to present some of my ideas in a keynote address (see King, 2009a) at the Malaysian Social Science Association’s (Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, PSSM) 6th International Malaysian Studies Conference in Kuching in August 2008. Professor Abdul Rahman Embong’s wide-ranging work on the middle classes in Malaysia and Southeast Asia is particularly relevant to my interest in social class, lifestyles, consumption and identity (1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). Professor Wan Zawawi Ibrahim’s writings in cultural studies and multiculturalism and his more recent work on Malaysian film and identity is also of great moment to me (1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Both of them encouraged me to give some thought to the effects of globalisation on local identities in the region and it spurred me to return to and reconsider some of the earlier work which I had undertaken on Borneo; Wan Zawawi also caused me to ponder whether or not our understanding of social and cultural change in Sarawak has been enhanced by recourse to the globalisation literature (King, 2012). What it also prompted me to do was to reconceptualise the concept of centres and margins in relation to changing identities; in other words that we can conceive of Borneo societies as gaining form and identity in their interrelationships and interaction with focal points of power and influence (King, 2001). For me this in turn requires a shift to the study of interactions in urban centres (see for example Boulanger, 2009), changing social class and ethnic configurations, the emergence of a politically aware, modern, educated elite, and the effects of urban-generated media and lifestyles on surrounding populations. Horstmann and Wadley have attempted to address this interaction the other way around in their concept of ‘cent[e]ring the margins’ (2006, and see Eilenberg, 2012, and Eilenberg and Wadley, 2009). With specific reference to the Bidayuh, Liana Chua has also reaffirmed the importance of examining both ‘urban leaders closely linked to ongoing state-level
formulations of cultural policy and practice’ as well as their rural cousins still located in village environments (2012: 185-186).

Above all I should acknowledge an old friend, colleague and mentor, Professor John Clammer, whose lectures I attended in 1971-72 in (what was then) modern anthropology at the University of Hull, and whose book Diaspora and Identity: the Sociology of Culture in Southeast Asia (2002) helped me to decide on how to tackle some of the complexities of identity in the region. Importantly he argues for the integration of cultural analysis into Asian Studies, and the need to understand the region in terms of a dynamic and holistic concept of culture and in relation to political economy (and see Ollier and Winter, 2006, and Reynolds, 2006). I have adopted Clammer’s concept of the ‘sociology of culture’ in my current work, although I think that the scope of what I am doing is rather different from his. John Clammer has certainly ranged over some of the broad issues which concern me here (culture, identity, globalisation, and consumption) but he focuses much more specifically than me on diaspora and identity and the construction and transformation of Chinese identities in Southeast Asia. Much of his book arises from various papers which he had presented at seminars and conferences with the addition of some reworked published materials, and in this regard the text has a certain disparate quality. Moreover, though it is presented as a region-wide perspective, the focus is primarily on Malaysia and Singapore.

Beginnings

After I had embarked on this study I began to realise how much work I had already undertaken on issues of culture and identity, though not in any co-ordinated, coherent, conscious or systematic fashion and how I had moved from an earlier rather more ‘traditional’ anthropological concept of culture to a more ‘modern’ one (I hesitate to use the term ‘post-modern’), though in all my work the concept has certainly not been firmly bounded, static and homogeneous.
My first period of field research in the early 1970s tended to treat culture as a means to delineate the communities in which I was interested at the time and this has involved me in a rather tortuous debate about the exonym ‘Maloh’ and the competing endonyms (see, for example, King, 1982, 1985, 2002). Looking back on it I was obviously in search of the exotic and I feel some embarrassment in reflecting on some of my earlier searches for ‘the other’. I wonder what the peoples of the Embaloh, Leboyan, Taman and Palin think of my attempts to represent them. Moving on, although I had the framework more or less handed to me I suppose I was also attracted subsequently to the utility of the notion of ‘a culture area’ in my general book on Borneo peoples (King, 1993a). How do we capture a mix of ethnic groupings and see them as an interrelated cultural complex of populations? At that time I was attracted to the idea of using Edmund Leach’s notions of interconnected social and cultural forms in flux or oscillation (1954). What remain clear were my observations that ethnic boundaries insofar as they could be drawn,
were never neatly delineated, fixed and unchanging, and the cultural stuff within the boundaries was never homogeneous and agreed upon. Grant Evans adopted a similar wide-ranging perspective in his attempts to understand the Tai-speaking sub-regions of mainland Southeast Asia (1999a: 8-13, 1999b).

Kasso, Benua Martinus (1973); image on the left also on the front cover of Victor T. King, The Maloh of West Kalimantan (1985); he was one of the author’s main informants

To continue, my later co-edited book with Michael Hitchcock then explored some of the issues, particularly in Indonesia, raised by what we then called ‘images’ of national, regional and local Malay-Indonesian identities and the interactions between these different expressive and symbolic levels or layers of identity, and we felt that it was especially important to examine how citizens and constituent groups of a nation-state attempt to come to terms with and respond to national level projects of identity formation (Hitchcock and King, 1997a, 1997b). Since then, in revisiting my earlier field research and in response to my critics, I have adopted a much more open-ended and contingent notion of culture and identity (2001; King and Wilder, 2003: 193-230). This shift in perspective has also been especially evident in my collaborative research on tourism, heritage and cultural change in Southeast Asia and the ways in which culture, identity and tradition are constructed, invented and contested (Hitchcock, King and Parnwell, 1993a, 1993b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010).

In my first sociology book I focused on the broad sweep of Southeast Asian history and examined in some detail the colonial period and its aftermath in terms of the notions of modernisation, underdevelopment and dependency among others. What I am primarily concerned with in my present study is the post-war period and the cultural effects and processes of modernisation and globalisation. In the title of this study - ‘identities in motion’ – I want to reflect, in comparative terms, the dynamic, shifting and fluid character of cultural identity. Nevertheless, I also want to
hold to a loosely formulated notion of comparison or ‘apt illustration’, hardly a comparative method, in helping to reveal the social and cultural characteristics of Southeast Asia and the processes at work there (see, for example, Béteille [1990: 6]). Recognising the problematical nature of comparison in the social sciences I think that I am on safer ground by confining myself to ‘restricted comparisons’ between neighbouring cases within one particular part of Asia (ibid: 22). Having said this I much admire the bold comparative work of Aat Vervoorn (2002) in attempting to cast light on social, cultural, political, economic and demographic changes across Asia (a region which for him remains undefined but sweeps from what I call the Middle East right through Central to East Asia including Southeast Asia). Nevertheless, I think one can be too bold.

Although I have drawn on some of my earlier publications I have had to develop, embellish, modify and in some cases radically revise what I wrote (and thought) then. However, in this paper I have decided to draw on some ideas from my paper entitled ‘Knowledge from the Margins of Malaysia: Globalisation and Research on the Ground’ for a book edited by Wan Zawawi Ibrahim Social Science and Knowledge in a Globalising World (2012), to appear as a publication of the Malaysian Social Science Association, an article entitled ‘The Middle Class in Southeast Asia: Diversities, Identities, Comparisons and the Vietnamese Case’ (2008b), and chapters entitled ‘Tourism and Culture in Malaysia’ (1993b) and ‘Anthropology and Tourism in Southeast Asia: Comparative Studies, Cultural Differentiation and Agency’ in a recently published co-edited book (2009b).
A Few Words on Culture

The Concept of Culture

It goes without saying that ‘culture’ is one of the most crucial, though overworked, and indeed ‘complicated’, ‘complex’, ‘controversial’ and ‘divergent’ concepts in the social sciences and, given its status as a focal point of interest, it has quite naturally been the subject of the most intense debates and disagreements (Jenks, 1993:1). It does not help that it is a term which is also used in a multitude of different ways in popular discourse and that it occurs with alarming and confusing regularity in discussions within and across a range of disciplines. In these debates culture is (or more specifically elements of it are) produced or constructed, deconstructed, invented, reinvented, reproduced, modified, discarded, lost, contemplated, inherited, disseminated, adopted, assimilated, absorbed, used, deployed, manipulated, elaborated, displayed, commoditised, exchanged, borrowed and transformed.

It is impossible to rehearse these debates and divergences in the detail that would be necessary to provide a comprehensive philosophical and analytical history of or even an extensive guide to the development of the concept of culture in social scientific enquiry and the range of interpretations which it has engendered. There is little if anything that is new under the sun, and therefore it seems unnecessary to repeat what has already been said and argued over ad nauseam. In any case there are numerous large and weighty volumes, compilations of readings and indeed slimmer introductory texts which have attempted to set down what culture is and what it is not (see, for example, Alexander and Seidman, 1990). One such attempt which I find especially useful, if at times somewhat tortuous and dense, even though it is meant for students and teachers of sociology, is that by Chris Jenks in the Routledge ‘Key Ideas’ series (1993). He presents us with a health warning when he says ‘The idea of culture embraces a range of topics, processes,
differences and even paradoxes such that only a confident and wise person would begin to pontificate about it and perhaps only a fool would attempt to write a book about it’ (ibid: 1).

Although, in search of culture, I have read for obvious reasons a considerable amount of literature in what has come to be known as ‘cultural studies’, associated particularly and seminally in Britain with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies founded at the University of Birmingham by Richard Hoggart in 1964 and continued vigorously by Stuart Hall in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s (the Centre eventually closed in 2002). However, I have found that it does not tell me anything that I had not already gleaned from the study of anthropology and sociology in a multi-disciplinary and non-Western area studies context. Hall’s explanation of and case for the emergence of cultural studies in breaking with ‘previous conceptualisations’ of culture and ‘moving the argument into the wider field of social practices and historical processes’ and away from the preserve of any one ‘disciplinary empire’, have always seemed to me to be unexceptional and based on a highly selective reading of analyses of culture, and with not much reference to some of the anthropological and sociological debates at the time (1980a:20; 1980b, 1990). But perhaps it was innovative in its multi- and interdisciplinary endeavours and in the rather more narrow context of sociology and anthropology as they were practised then, embracing as it did ethnography, history, media studies, and English language and literary studies, in its attempts to address ‘long-term shifts taking place in British society and culture within the framework of a long, retrospective, historical glance’ and from the vantage point of what had been happening in Britain through the early post-war period (1980a:16). Of course, it also speaks to us of the experiences and perceptions of the marginalised, de-centred, migrant, hybrid communities which emerged out of the processes of decolonisation, migration to and settlement in Britain and which provided a particular perspective on issues of identity and belongingness (Morley and Chen, 1996: 13-15, 17-18; Hall and Sakai, 1998: 363). There has also been an important stream of writing within the cultural studies framework focusing on issues of decolonisation in the former
colonised parts of the world, though some of this, I confess, I have not read to any advantage (Chen, 1998a, 1998b). However, I think the issue of marginality does deserve our serious attention, and it has become particularly important in Borneo with the more recent interest in ‘borders’, ‘borderlands’ and ‘frontiers’ (Amster, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Bala, 2000, 2001, 2002; Eilenberg, 2012; Fariastuti, 2002; Ishikawa, 2010; Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, 2002).

![Upper Embaloh Iban (1972)](image)

**Culture and the Social**

Returning to Jenks, I view culture as primarily a sociological and historical problem and something which is located in and implicated in societies, social contexts and social relations. However, I am by no means prepared to hold to a rigorously ‘social’ and mechanistic explanation of and origin for culture; neither am I prepared to argue that culture is totally dependent on or a mere reflection of society or in some way reducible to it, nor that it simply and straightforwardly ‘reproduces’ society. As Alexander has said in examining certain dimensions of ‘the cultural’, ‘[t]he meaning of an ideology or belief system cannot be read from social behaviour’ (1990:25). In my view therefore culture is in some degree autonomous and interacts with social relations in dialectical and dynamic ways; it therefore has the capacity to condition and motivate forms of social action and to generate social and economic change. As Clammer suggests, in his discussion of ‘subjectivities’, individuals engage in change subjectively; they have an ‘inner relationship’ with it, negotiate ‘new understandings of reality and of relationships and expanding or changing conceptions of the self’ (2002:16). Culture quite obviously lends behavioural quality, content and meaning to social relationships, as Firth proposed many years ago, in the dim and distant ‘functionalist’ past (1951). It has an imaginative and creative dimension because it is quite obviously a product of our mental processes and is expressed and embodied in our language, and as Purushotam sensibly observes, even though we know that everyday social constructs are indeed ‘constructed’, we cannot but be ‘emotionally connected’ to them (1998a:vii).

Having said this culture is not a free-floating, detached agent and it does tend to adhere to particular social forms. In this connection I do not use his concept but I think my views are close
to Boike Rehbein’s notion of ‘sociocultures’, though for him the cultural dimension appears to be closely implicated in what he calls ‘the division of work’ (2007:1). What needs to be emphasised however, rather than a particular dimension of culture is that cultural regularities and certain cultural elements are given more significance, relevance and meaningfulness in the context of and through the demands generated by the imperative of living and surviving together. In other words ‘[i]ndividuals interacting together impose their constructions upon reality’ (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979: 63). Nevertheless, those constructions are not set in stone; they are malleable and they feed back on social encounters in various ways, particularly in the context of late modernity with the emergence of groups of specialists whose professional roles and responsibilities are to produce, reproduce and disseminate knowledge, symbols and material expressions of culture (Featherstone, 2000:15-16).

Jenks attempts to capture this problematic between what Alexander calls ‘mechanistic’ and ‘subjective’ approaches to culture (1990: 1-3) in his discussion of Weber’s sociological methodology and particularly his difficult, one might say frequently obscure concept of an’ ideal type’. In attempting to grasp and analyse culture, Jenks proposes, on Weber’s behalf, that

The state of a culture .... makes reference to the shared individual unconscious held by a people. This is a very diffuse concept but it enables us to reconcile the multiplicity of possible meanings that derive from how any particular aspect of culture appears to different individuals and likewise the multiplicity of different courses of action that may all contrive to give rise to a particular aspect of culture. So social life and the understanding of social life contain strategies….which contrive to bring off a sense of uniformity and singularity in relation to our knowledge of cultural events. We create types, typifications or ideal pictures…’ (1993: 53).

Culture like the social order also has certain biological and psycho-physical interconnections which suggests that each (the cultural and the social) is not derived from or dependent on the other in any direct cause-and-effect sense. Social orders (which include both economic and political relations) present opportunities, constraints and pressures; cultural expressions or representations are also used to legitimise, symbolically express and assign values to particular sets of social relations, differences and reciprocities, for example with regard to social class hierarchies or the gender division of labour or the relations between generations or residential arrangements (Alexander, 1990: 1-27; Vervoorn, 2002: 42-44). They do so through the formulation of ideologies which serve to generalise the specific interests of those who formulate them. Yet culture does more than this because it is embedded in and is an essential part of, indeed both a motor and expression of social actions and the choices made in acting, ‘all of which are subjective, intersubjective and volatile – but real, tangible and material in their consequences’ (Jenks, 1993: 57; Clammer, 2002:16-17). The overriding fact is that people
ostensibly act and choose as individuals and they do so subjectively and in terms of cultural meanings and understandings, but they do so in a collective environment in relation to others, and they do so in pursuing their livelihoods and interests and in engaging in economic, political and social activities and in formulating strategies of action and engagement.

**Culture’s Definition**

Before embarking on this exercise in definition we should remind ourselves that culture is a concept; it is, as Kahn proposes, an ‘intellectual construct’ (1992: 161). Having said this I need to attempt to identify the main defining criteria which I consider significant in delimiting culture. For me the following are important: Culture is taught, learned, shared and transmitted as a part of collective life (this is purely Parsonian [1951]; and also derives from the Tylorian ‘complex whole’ [1871]). It comprises the ideational, conceptual, conscious dimension of human life and the ideas, accumulated skills and expertise embodied in material objects (art and artefacts) and carried and given expression most vitally in language. It encompasses the symbolic, meaningful, evaluative, interpretative, motivated, cognitive and classificatory dimensions of humanity (Geertz has an input here, but so have others before him [1973]). It refers in its more popular connotations to ‘ways of life’ and ‘ways of behaving’; it is therefore pervasive. It has to be understood in terms of form, content and process and although there are cultural regularities and continuities which are easily detected, there are also quite obviously alterations, modifications and transformations. In some ways, though not as neatly bounded as was once originally supposed, it is patterned and has a certain systematic quality so that someone who has not been socialised into a particular culture, can, when he or she has discovered its ethical judgements, values, standards, beliefs and views of the world, the connections which it makes between cause and effect and the explanations which it provides for the place and function of humans within the natural world and for the bases of human interaction, organisation and behaviour, can make sense of it even without necessarily approving of its underlying principles. Having said all of this I do accept that there may be events and behaviour which are beyond culture or constitute a ‘counterpoint’ to it which is not ‘meaningful’ or ‘comprehensible’ (Daniel, 1991).

We should also take note of what culture is not. As hinted at above, it is not, in ‘essentialist’ mode, firmly bounded, closed and delineated. It is not a totality rather it is open-ended and constantly in process. In this connection social science analyses also need to adopt comparative
perspectives, examine several sites, and move across disciplines and time. Moreover, culture is not homogeneous, integrated and agreed rather it is contested and is part of systems of power and privilege, as well as generated, sustained and transformed in strategies, discourses and practices; these contests and struggles operate at different levels and in different arenas. But, although those who have power and control economic resources can more easily impose their cultural visions and values on others, this imposition or in Gramsci’s terms ‘cultural hegemony’ is never complete (Gramsci, 1990: 47-54; 1978; and see Hall, 1996a:411-440, and Scott 1985).

**Culture and Identity**

In my view culture is also very closely implicated in the concept of identity, or ethnicity. I prefer not to use the term ‘race’ in this connection, although in political ideologies formulated in Southeast Asia which have been created in the context of nation-building, ‘race’ is often used in place of ethnicity and identity (Kahn, 1992: 160-163). For me what we are concerned with are cultural and not physiological similarities and differences. It was Raoul Naroll among many others who defined ‘ethnic units’ as ‘culture-bearing units’, although his mechanistic approach, now very dated, to cross-cultural classification was heavily criticised and abandoned many years ago (1964). Some social scientists have indeed talked of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘cultural identity’ in the same breath because the main elements of ethnicity and identity are cultural ones: they comprise values, beliefs, and behaviour and the meanings which are given or attached to these as well as differences (and similarities) in language and material culture. However, ethnicity has increasingly come to be seen as a special kind of identity attached to particular groups, communities, majorities or minorities and which command broader or larger scale forms of allegiance and loyalty. In its specifically ethnic dimension identity is what distinguishes or differentiates a particular category or group of individuals from others. Ethnicity is frequently expressed as unifying and differentiating people at varying levels of contrast, and with the process of separating or distinguishing some from others.
by certain cultural criteria. In many cases that which unifies some people is considered to be what makes them human; in other words it is their particular culture which marks them off and gives them identity and which logically encourages them to classify others as less than human, as sub-human, savage, barbaric or primitive (Leach, 1982). This is especially the case when majority or dominant populations in nation-states classify and talk about the minorities which they wish to control and administer through incorporation into a modern, national project as ‘marginal’ and ‘unsophisticated’ communities requiring special attention.

In this connection one of the major concerns of political scientists working on Southeast Asia has been processes of nation-building and the associated tensions and conflicts between attempts by political elites to unify and homogenise (to exercise sovereignty and to construct citizens) and the responses of the constituent communities of the territorially-defined state which often wish to retain separate and viable identities. Boundary definition and maintenance is also rendered much more problematical in situations of ‘cultural hybridisation and syncretism’ (Chua, 1995:1), and where those populations of the borderlands do not acknowledge any particular allegiance to the central government and share cultural identities with communities on the other side of the border (Eilenberg, 2012: 23-30). In addition, a relatively neglected field of research has been the ways in which the media and communications technology have been deployed in the construction of national identities and the effects of the globalised media and other cultural flows on both national and local identities (see, for example, Bala, 2007; Postill, 2006; and Barlocco, 2008, 2009). In my view this subject has not received the attention it deserves given the legacy of one of the most prominent social scientists of Southeast Asia, Benedict Anderson and his examination of the ways in which the nation is constructed and ‘imagined’ through various devices, including such media agencies as newsprint (1991).
Culture and Process

Let us turn briefly to a consideration of processes. My particular interests comprise the multi-dimensional and shifting qualities of the concept of cultural identity or identities, or as I have called it ‘identities in motion’. This concern is located in the context of nation-building, globalisation, modernisation, local responses, population movements and boundary-crossing, the expansion of international tourism, information technology and the media and the associated cultural encounters which these processes entail on identity formation, maintenance and change. In other words rather than unified identities and cultures we now think increasingly in terms of heterogeneity, fluidity and transformation and the role of human agency in the processes through which identities are constructed, sustained and transformed. Featherstone captures the spirit of this when he argues that we should be focusing on the ‘diversity and many-sidedness of culture’ and its ‘syncretisms and hybridisations’ (2000: 14).

Another of my preoccupations is to investigate the literature on cultural production with reference in particular to the processes by which cultural products are consumed and the styles of life and identities which are associated with particular patterns of consumption. This is an especially important subject of interest and research in Southeast Asia given the spectacular growth in the affluence of young consumers in the region, as well as the dramatic expansion of a middle class, and the importance of women as consumers of cultural products in the context of shifts in gender roles and statuses. This in turn is related to processes of globalisation, although it is not simply a question of the cultural flows from the West, particularly the United States, to the developing world. As Featherstone has demonstrated ‘there is a growing sense of multipolarity and the emergence of competing centres’. He continues ‘Certainly Japan and East Asia are of growing global significance, currently largely in terms of consumer goods and finance rather than images and information’ (2000:8-9; and see 1991). This view needs some qualification in that for Southeast Asia in particular Japan and neighbouring Korea and Hong Kong are also becoming important centres of cultural images and lifestyles. However, the subject of cultural production and lifestyles is not something that has received that much attention in Borneo, at least to my knowledge.

The focal concept of identity is therefore bound up with processes of cultural construction and transformation and the various forms and levels of identity can never be taken to be complete and firmly established. They are always in the process of ‘becoming’ and they are invariably located in a world of competing and interacting identities made more intense by the impacts of globalisation and media technology, nation-building, and trans-national movements and encounters. As Goh has said ‘If culture is a site of difference under modern conditions, then there is an urgency for us to understand how differences are produced, transformed, and sustained within concrete cultural and historical contexts and under the aegis of various types of agency’ (2002: 28). Obviously my thinking has been stimulated, as has Goh’s and others, by contributions to the study of culture from different disciplinary perspectives which have examined the construction of identities and ‘collectivities’.

It is probably Stuart Hall who captures the shifting and contextualised character of identity (which is valuable in the Southeast Asian context) when he coins the term ‘new ethnicities’. He says with regard to ethnicity specifically, though in relation to race, ‘black cultural politics’ and the politics
of representation in relation to Britain, that ‘ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual’ (1996b: 446; 1997, 2000).

**Culture, Contestation and Power**

As I have said elsewhere drawing on the important socio-historical work of Wim Wertheim (and his Dutch colleagues) on Indonesia and the wider Asia, societies or social units or human communities are never in harmony nor are they ever integrated. They are, in Wertheim’s terms ‘a composite of conflicting value systems’, and in addition they embody ‘conflicting interests’ or ‘forces’ (Béteille, 1990: 16-17; and see 1969). There are always strains, tensions, contradictions, conflicts, opposition, competition, antagonism, discontent, and protest, even though those who embrace and promote the dominant ideas strive to present images of harmony, consensus and integration (Wertheim, 1964, 1967, 1974, 1993; King, 2008a: 32-35; Vervoorn, 2002: 41, 52-55). Social and cultural processes are dialectical, in Wertheim’s terms (1967). It is this dimension of power, hierarchy and conflict which interests me in my concern with the sociology and more particularly the political economy of culture because culture, as a resource, is shaped, deployed and transformed in these struggles (and see Chen, 1998a: 3; and Winter and Ollier, 2006: 11). In this hierarchical respect we are also touching on the debates which focused on the distinction between cultural elitism or high culture on the one hand with its assumptions of the sophisticated appreciation of culture by the educated and understanding few, and on the other hand popular culture with its connotations of the passive reception of mass-produced, consumption-oriented products by the many; this was a distinction which was discredited some while ago, and a distinction which does not map directly onto class structures (Featherstone, 2000: 20: Storey, 2003).

Jenks has the sense of it when he says ‘There are no societies in which the quality of life is not differentiated by complexes of class, status and power, and as societies become more complex this differentiation becomes more marked, but also more subtly encoded in networks of symbolic cultural representations’ (1993: 99; and see Clammer, 2002: 32). Neither is culture something which is received passively and the preserve of those apparently equipped to understand it. Therefore, culture is not an internally coherent system of meanings but an arena in which people with different interests and with different interpretations and meanings act, engage, co-operate, compete and struggle and in which power and relations of inequality are expressed, constructed, exercised and resisted (Goh, 2002: 29-38; and see Williams, 1965). Any culture is subject to revision and adaptation, particularly in contexts in which those of different cultures encounter one another and interact, and, although a Cambodian refugee in the United States for example carries with him ‘a ready-made set of interpretive frameworks’ in order to make sense of the world around him, he is ‘constantly rearranging and reinventing those frameworks and belief systems to deal with immediate events’ (Smith, 1994: 142).

The reader will see how closely connected this perspective is to Foucault’s concept of ‘discourse’ and the role of knowledge, ideas, images and cultural categories in exercising control, regulation and domination over others; in short people deal in cultural capital and use it in social and political strategies (1977, 1980). Interestingly debates about the appropriateness of Western-derived post-structuralist and post-colonialist frames have reached a high level of intensity in Thai
cultural studies during the past couple of decades (Jackson, 2004, 2005; Morris, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000 2002; Thongchai, 1994). It was here that essentialist and modernisation readings of the uniqueness of Thai culture and its non-colonial status provoked reactions which sought for an understanding of Thai culture in a qualified, modified, nuanced comparative, post-structuralist analysis of the relationship between power, knowledge and meaning (Jackson, 2004, 2005). It is here too that debates about differentiation and convergence within processes of globalisation and the appropriateness or otherwise of Western-derived theories surface.

A necessarily related concept is that of the ‘intentional actor’, who is both imbued with or perhaps socialised into ideas, meanings, values and attitudes but through interaction and action (or ‘practice’) realises these and is at the same time constrained and patterned by them, but also manoeuvres, modifies, adjusts and changes them in negotiating with everyday life, with the varied environments or ‘fields’ within which he or she moves, and with the contradictions and problems which these situations generate. This all sounds very like Bourdieu and his conceptual distinctions between ‘habitus’ (embodied structure, objective inscription, learned ‘dispositions’), ‘capital’ (as social, economic, symbolic, cultural and political resources deployed in interaction and encounters) and ‘field’ (the sphere of social action, game-playing and agency, beyond but related to embodied structure, with shifting, overlapping boundaries) (1977, 1984). However, I do not use these concepts here; it seems to me that what I want to describe has already been addressed in more straightforward language; that Bourdieu’s notion of field still seems unnecessarily static, ahistorical and mechanical; that, in class status and power terms, particular groups with particular kinds of socially valued capital can dominate several fields which are therefore arranged in hierarchical fashion; and that fields should be envisaged as transcending the boundaries of nation-states (and see Rehbein, 2007: 22-31).

In rather more simple terms Goh attempts to summarise these various strands of analysis when she says, in relation to conscious and ‘purposeful’ actors, the cultural system possesses ‘very powerful and determining effects on people, yet there are always emergent and residual possibilities located in people’s experiences, passions, and aspirations to effect changes in society’ (2002: 37). What seems to me to be of special moment in Goh’s work is that, by using this perspective, she manages to bridge the divide between ‘culturalist’ and ‘materialist’ or political economy approaches.
Identity and Ethnicity Revisited

I have already indicated with Michael Hitchcock, in our excursion into images of identity in the Malay-Indonesian world, that it is analytically useful to distinguish identities and their ‘modes of representation’ at different levels or scales of magnitude (Hitchcock and King, 1997b). We emphasised the importance of examining the images of nationhood or the identities expressed and displayed at the national level as well as identities at the sub-national level which comprise what are usually referred to as ethnic groups or alternatively tribes, peoples or communities (and see Vervoorn, 2002: 82-95). Identity, or as Hitchcock and I referred to it then ‘ethnicity’ (rather than ‘race’ [and racial groups] which is often used in popular and state discourse in such places as Singapore and Malaysia to refer to the same phenomenon), comprises a form of social cleavage and is a means of organising social and cultural relations in terms of similarity and difference and with reference primarily to origins (Du Gay, Evans and Redman, 2000a, 2000b; Postill, 2008: 196). As Barth noted many years ago in what has become a seminal statement in the study of ‘ethnic groups’, that identities and differences entail the establishment and maintenance of boundaries and are generated in encounters and interactions across boundaries (1969). Indeed,
identity cannot exist apart from the establishment and maintenance of ‘cultural difference’ and the formation and operation of boundaries, and is constructed and sustained in relationships, both at the level of ideas and in practice and performance with others who are perceived to be and categorised as ‘not us’ or ‘other’. In other words the way in which ethnicity operates is ‘relational’ (Boulanger, 2009: 19).

Classifications of people and the bases on which categories are formulated can also be quite arbitrary and comprise what we might term ‘folk models’, ‘stereotypes’ or ‘typifications’ (Purushotam, 1998a: 19). Identities might be relatively ‘contingent, fragile and incomplete’ (Du Gay, Evans and Redman, 2000b: 2), though we must recognise that we can get rather carried away with notions of contingency and fragility and some identities are more viable and enduring than others. Folk models of identity are relatively straightforward cultural short-hands to facilitate navigation through one’s daily life. However, we have to acknowledge that things are not as simple as this and that processes of cultural exchange, intermarriage, physical resettlement and absorption generate hybrid communities which bridge boundaries and partake of elements from more than one category or group or they generate multiple identities which co-exist, but which may be invoked according to circumstances. In these connections it is important to examine the ways in which these mixed communities establish and express their identities and how political elites define and address them in policy and administrative terms for purposes of nation-building (Chua, 1995: 1-3). A particular issue in Malaysia, for example, has been whether or not to include certain hybrid communities, which have some claim to Malay antecedents, in the constitutionally important and politically dominant category of ‘indigenes’ (bumiputera: lit. sons of the soil) (Goh, 2002).

It is sometimes difficult to anticipate what elements will be given significance in establishing similarity and difference, but the processes of identifying and differentiating are deeply cultural (Kahn, 1992: 159). The importance of addressing cultural processes is demonstrated directly and with full force in any analysis of ethnicity and identity. Obviously those who study ethnicity and identity have to examine the criteria which can be used to unite and differentiate people and choose which make sense and are most appropriate and useful in their analyses. These may or may not correspond with the criteria which the people under study themselves use, the so-called ‘subjective’ dimension of identity, though it is unlikely that a serious scholar would ignore the perceptions and views of local people (Nagata, 1974, 1975, 1979) or in Chua’s terms ‘native exegesis’ (2007). But an outside observer in attempting to construct wider ranging classifications for comparative purposes might well choose to emphasise certain criteria, say language, at the expense of others, or perhaps cuisine and costume. In the context of classification a useful distinction is that between a ‘category’ (which is the ideational or conceptual dimension of identity by which individuals are assigned or assign themselves to a particular unit within a system of units) and ‘group’ (which pertains to the dimension of social interaction and communication). Categories may not therefore acquire the characteristics of a group in which people actively realise their identity and unite to express and promote it (King, 2001; King and Wilder, 2003: 197).

We should also note that, although I have chosen to talk about ‘ethnicity’ rather than ‘race’, the distinction between the two concepts is sometimes difficult to make in that the existence of
physical differences between people do not in themselves generate racial differences; these are subject to interpretation and are assigned meanings which in turn usually result in what is termed ‘racism’ or racial prejudice (Boulanger, 2009:3). Furthermore, in association with ‘the cultural distinctiveness of a particular group [people] may invent, or at least exaggerate the prevalence of a “look” the members of the group allegedly share’ (ibid). An important way in which ethnic groups can be created and their boundaries fixed is also by linking cultural differences with racial-biological ones and the colonial powers tended to talk in terms of modes of cultural behaviour and attitudes rooted in biology and genetic predisposition (Hirschman, 1986).

The establishment of identities can also entail a range of active interactions (cultural exchange, social intercourse including possibly intermarriage, trade and commerce, political alliance, and even peaceful assimilation) across the boundaries between different or separate groupings or they may involve processes of exclusion, avoidance, non-recognition or hostility, the latter sometimes resulting in political subjugation, economic exploitation, forced acculturation or in extreme cases genocide. In the case of the construction of national identities we can see how politically dominant groups, or in more abstract terms ‘the state’, attempt to promote, disseminate and sometimes impose on others their notions of identity and what that identity comprises. In some inter-group interactions both positive and negative relations may operate simultaneously or one form may replace the other over time.

**Primordialism and Instrumentalism**

It was argued some time ago that ‘essentialist’ approaches to the understanding of ethnicity and identity, usually glossed in Geertzian terms as ‘primordialism’ or the ‘basic givens’ of a community, which place emphasis on the strong sentiments attached to shared origins, genealogy, descent and traditions (1963), should be replaced with a perspective, usually referred to as ‘constructivist’ or ‘instrumentalist’, which focuses on the ways in which identities are actively constructed, maintained and transformed, and, at times, used strategically and contextually for the accumulation of wealth, status and power (Dentan, 1975; Nagata, 1974; and see Kahn, 1992: 170-171, and Mackerras, 2003:12). Chua captures this debate in relation to the Biduyuh of Sarawak in terms of the distinction between ‘fixity’ (which refers to those ethnic categories like Malay which do not permit movement in and out, or those officially ordained and prescribed in constitutional terms by government) and ‘fluidity’ (where individuals can move in and out of an identity and, in performative and situational mode, continue to express elements of a previous identity from which they have departed through religious conversion) (2007).

We have seen that the same debates have been conducted in relation to the broader concept of culture and the importance of examining the dynamic rather than the supposedly fixed, continuous, unchanging and traditional dimensions of culture. In this connection Kessler has argued, following Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), that in a fast-changing and modernising present, ‘tradition’ or ‘the past’, rather than ‘an unchanged residue… becomes a resource now capable of being consciously used to fashion and legitimate a form of life that exists only in a problematic and contingent present’ (1992: 134-135). Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that however fluid and contingent ‘identities’ are, they take on a real and more solid and fixed quality, for most if not all of us. We desire to make them more ‘natural’ and ‘embedded’ than they actually are (and see Postill, 2008: 196-197); and language (and whether or not it is a lingua
franca) is a vital element in claims for distinctiveness and difference or alternatively sameness and shared identity/ethnicity (ibid: 216-217).

Even in the 1970s in Southeast Asia anthropologists were examining the ways in which identities (using such alternative terms as ‘tribal’, ‘indigenous’, ‘native’, ‘minority’) are not straightforwardly carried unchanging from the past and anchored reassuringly in some distant ancestral time and space, but they are instead constructed and invented. Indeed, as a ‘resource’ they can be ‘switched’, ‘manipulated’, ‘deployed’ and ‘used’, and many anthropological studies in the region focused on the fluid and strategic ways in which particular communities adopt and discard identities, and the role-playing and behaviour associated with them, according to circumstances, needs and interests (Nagata, 1975, 1979; Dentan, 1975). Individuals can also carry multiple identities and deploy these as different situations and interactions demand (Dentan, 1976: 78; King and Wilder, 2003:196-200; Nagata, 1979). This is especially so in situations where minority populations are having to come to terms with more powerful majorities as in the case of the minority Semai and the majority, politically dominant Malays in Malaysia (Dentan, 1975).

Well before this important work on minorities in Southeast Asia Edmund Leach had already developed the argument that identity had to be examined as a historical process; he demonstrated this with regard to interactions between the Kachin and Shan of Highland Burma and the fact that social forms and identities of the upland-dwelling tribal Kachin were forged and transformed in relation to the valley-dwelling Shan who were organised into hierarchical states. Kachin socio-political organisation and identities were therefore unstable and subject to change and were indeed used strategically (1954). This gave rise to a whole series of studies on the relations between upland and lowland populations in Southeast Asia and the ways in which identities were developed and changed (see King and Wilder, 2003).

Therefore, Hall’s later declarations about identity from the perspective of cultural studies, though well taken, are rather predictable and unexceptional. However, the strength of Hall’s argument is precisely because it is underpinned by his own personal experiences and his contemplation of his own, in many respects, problematical identity. That is why he focuses on the ways in which one’s ‘position’ or ‘identity’ generates meaning, but which can never be final or closed (Hall and Sakai, 1998: 373). Hall sets aside an ‘essentialist’, ‘naturalist’ concept of identity in favour of a ‘discursive’, ‘strategic’, ‘positional’ one. Cultural identities are therefore ‘never unified…never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting discourses, practices and positions’ (2000: 17). He points to constant transformations in identity, their processual nature and their incompleteness; the contextualisation of identity historically; the construction of identity in relation to ‘the play of power’ and in relation to the exclusion of ‘the Other’ (ibid: 17-18; and see 1990). Creating ‘otherness’ is a crucial process in the study of identity, and it is an activity in which anthropologists, in constructing ‘other cultures’ have developed particular skills.

National Identities

Let me say something about national identities; these are constructed and presented by those in power in independent, politically and territorially defined units which we refer to as ‘states’. As Thongchai says,
It is generally supposed that a nation is a collective body to which individuals must belong... that...[it]... has essential traits commonly imbued in its members, who, moreover, have the same national interest. Patriotism, loyalty, and other affiliations in terms of ideas, sentiments, and practices appear to be natural relationships (1994: 1).

However, as we have seen, nations are constructed or ‘imagined’. Political elites engage in nation-building to promote collective solidarity, unity and cohesion and hopefully to maintain political stability and in so doing keep themselves in power, and with political stability (most of them at least) attempt to promote economic and social development. Political leaders are usually assisted in this myth-making enterprise to ‘make’ citizens and ‘construct’ a national community by senior bureaucrats and by intellectuals (which include historians, novelists, poets, painters, and musicians) which is driven down to educational institutions, and they in turn have to deliver the national project to their students (Barr and Skrbis, 2008: 41). Indeed, as a sense of national identity becomes embedded it is frequently ‘intellectuals’, ‘artists’ of various kinds and more generally ‘cultural intermediaries’ who continuously contest, re-produce and re-negotiate national culture and convert cultural products into forms which can be disseminated and consumed by ordinary people (Zawawi Ibrahim, 2009: 2-3). Territories, though in some sense constructed, are also real; lines drawn on maps and what is contained within those lines usually matter and have consequences for those who are considered on the one hand to belong to a particular state (they are ‘citizens’ or recognised ‘legal residents’) and those on the other who do not and who have to secure permission to reside or work there for a period (Clammer, 2002:22; Vervoorn, 2002: 38-40). Territoriality is ‘the most concrete feature, the most solid foundation, literally and connotatively, of nationhood as a whole’ (Thongchai, 1994: 17). Yet, the borders are still porous and there has to be a sensitive analysis of the effects of the power of the centre and the opportunities and abilities of the margins. Moreover, the state enterprise, most notably in ‘weak states’ usually produces unevenness, fragmentation, dislocation and heterogeneity, particularly in border areas, as we shall see in post-Suharto Indonesia (Eileenberg, 2012; Ishikawa, 2010).
However difficult it might be in a mobile, globalised world, governments attempt to police and monitor their borders, allowing some people in under certain conditions and excluding or deporting others (yet again I recognise that some borders are not as amenable to control and policing as others, and this in turn depends, in part at least, on how motivated and capable the central government is in exerting the state’s sovereignty). The political leaders’ vision of what defines a state is backed by ‘agents of law enforcement’ who attempt to exercise control within a particular territory (Purushotam, 1998a: 5). The building of a state and a nation with specific borders also requires the development of a physical infrastructure – housing, schools, estates, and a communication network along with national monuments and public buildings – which serves to underpin the process of constructing a sense of national identity and belongingness among the citizenry (Barr and Skrbiš, 2008: 39-41). Interestingly in addition to the realities imposed by territorial boundaries, some observers have noted that there is a ‘reality’ even in the ‘imagined’ realms of national identity (though not necessarily for everyone). In the late 1990s Kahn for example, although he suggested that the relationship between state and nation (or the ‘blood-territory equation of classical nationalist….movements’) was at that time, and in his view, becoming attenuated, indeed ‘breaking down’ under the impact of globalisation among other things, he nevertheless, recognised ‘the very real power’ of the beliefs which underpin nationalism (1998a: 17-26).
I have already argued elsewhere in relation to what I preferred to call ethnicity (or identity) then that it is not merely an ideological expression or an idiom or reflection of something which is considered to be more concrete. This concreteness is usually sought in the economic realm and in social class terms and as Kahn has proposed the attempts to reduce ethnic identity to social class relations, ‘must still take ethnic attachment as a given’ (1992: 172). What is patently clear to me is that sharing an identity, however constructed, can provide ‘a powerful means to mobilise people to take a particular course of action’ (King, 2008a; 130). In the extreme case people are willing to kill or be killed in the process of projecting and defending their identity.

A state claims identity, separateness and autonomy on the basis of defined boundaries which separate it from like units and within which its citizens are assumed, encouraged or coerced to share a common nationhood which comprises such cultural elements as a language, history, origins and a sense of belonging, expressed in symbolic terms in anthems, flags and national rituals (Thongchai, 1994: 1-19). Ethnic designations are often conflated with the concept of the nation so that the boundaries of the state are seen as coterminous with the ethnically-defined nation (Evans, 1999a: 7). This modern cartographic device framing a shared ethnicity is very different from the pre-European, religiously-based conceptions of a polity as part of a cosmic or celestial order, identified with a ruler who was divine or semi-divine, in which there were spheres of influence and domains of sacred space which were not precisely defined in territorial terms (Thongchai, 1994: 20-36, 55,133-135). In political terms boundaries were rather zones, corridors or margins which were ‘not determined or sanctioned by the central authority’ (ibid: 75).

Importantly in a colonial context the constituents of a dependent state and those who governed and were governed were also often framed and conceptualised in terms of racial difference (Purushotam, 1998a: 6-7; 1998b). There were dominant races, native or indigenous races and immigrant races; racial differences and racial purity were central ideas in European colonialism and were frequently used to explain behaviour, motivation, socio-economic position and much more besides (Evans, 1999a: 16). However, it is this very notion of a ‘nation’, a realisation and acceptance of oneness, rather than that of an objectively defined and legally and territorially recognised ‘state’ which usually requires construction and continuous reinforcement through state action and its use of the media, symbolism and national educational systems – in the creation of national symbols, myths, histories, events and institutions. A shared ancestry or common origin, designed to build a ‘sense of belonging’, is often claimed which is associated with physical or territorial connectedness, cultural commonalities and various symbolic elements (Barr and Skrbiš, 2008: 2-3; Mackerras, 2003:11). An important arena of construction is that of language and language use in relation to identity and what language or languages are privileged in the formation and socialisation of a nation (Purushotam, 1998a: 8-9). More than this it is a political search for order and control and in the forging of a national identity. As Silverstone suggests, identities are a means to order daily life and manage social responsibilities and roles (1994: 1). Let us now take this down to the level of the province or a state within a federation in order to see how identities are constructed through time.

Identities in Sarawak

The complexity of ethnicity in Sarawak and more widely in Borneo is well known (see for example King, 1993a; Boulanger, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2009; Zawawi Ibrahim, 2008a, 2008b;
Nevertheless, the ethnic classifications which emerged in peninsular Malaysia during the colonial period (specifically the division between ‘Malays’ and ‘Chinese’), and the broad categories of identification which were gradually formulated by the British and then underwent post-colonial institutionalisation there became influential in the Malaysian Borneo states where the local population increasingly oriented themselves to these externally imposed stereotypes. Yet it could never be adopted in any thoroughgoing fashion primarily because there were two major categories of bumiputera in Malaysian Borneo: one was the Muslim Malays and the other the mainly non-Muslim Dayaks, complicated by the presence of such ‘liminal’ groups as the Melanau who were primarily Muslim, though with a minority of Christians, but were not Malay and in various of their traditional or pagan beliefs and practices were closer to Dayak cultures (Boulanger, 2009: 19). A further complication is that, although the ‘supra-ethnic’ term ‘Dayak’ has been adopted in various contexts by the local populations (particularly in political encounters, political party membership, elections and competition for resources) where it is important to build and maintain wider solidarities in interaction with Muslims (mainly Malays) and Chinese, there are also sub-ethnic identities like ‘Iban’, ‘Bidayuh’ (even though these categories are also constructions and are not without their problems, as is the more recent sub-ethnic construct ‘Orang Ulu’).

The Brooke Raj in Sarawak like the British administration in Peninsular Malaysia, operating within the requirements of a colonial political economy, formulated ethnic classifications and usually ascribed the groups thus delineated with particular and generalised personalities and habits. The regime ‘heralded the start of a growing interest in establishing workable classifications that would facilitate the task of governance and control’ (Chua, 2012: 36). Noboru Ishikawa, for example, presents an interesting historical narrative of the ethnic differentiation of agriculture and landscape in the Lundu district of Sarawak from the Brooke period onwards (2010: 15-42). James Brooke’s ‘Sea Dayaks’, later to become known increasingly as ‘Iban’, were from the Rajah’s perspective turbulent and war-like sea-going head-hunters and pirates, though led astray by the Malays; they were ideal as ‘military conscripts when the need arose’; the ‘Land Dayaks’ on the other hand he saw as oppressed, exploited, timid and quiet people who had been forced to retreat from mainly Malay domination and Iban raiding to the interior uplands; they required the protection of a paternal Raj (Boulanger, 2009: 29, 34). The Land Dayaks were a relatively culturally and linguistically diverse complex of peoples which eventually came to be designated as ‘Bidayuh’, which was a Bukar-Sadong endonym raised to the status of a general reference for all those who had been referred to as ‘Land Dayaks’ as well as neighbouring groups like the Selako (Chua, 2012: 36). The Brooke Raj, through the first Rajah James and his successor nephew Charles, set about defining ethnic boundaries. Given their assessment of Malay-Dayak relations, and the Raj’s need to control and administer a culturally plural society, the decision was taken to separate the Malays, some of whom were recruited into the lower echelons of the administration, socially and politically from their Dayak charges. The Chinese were assigned the role of petty traders, miners and small-scale cash-crop farmers. Restrictions were also placed on intermarriage and interaction between different Dayak groups (Boulanger, 2009: 35; Pringle, 1970: 90-91, 282-288, 299-302, 310). In addition, the imposition of a Western-style administrative structure, the pacification of those who were former enemies (even though they were culturally similar) and improvements in communications also served to connect previously
isolated and divided populations and helped create a consciousness of and identification with larger scale cultural units.

In comparison with the Sea and Land Dayaks, which, although not culturally homogeneous were at least rather more easily demarcated, the scatter of minority indigenous communities in interior Sarawak defied any simple description. It was this miscellany which, in the immediate post-Raj period Edmund Leach divided into three major sub-categories: ‘Kayan-Kenyah-Kajang’, the Kajang being exceedingly problematical and something of a ‘leftover’ hotchpotch in relation to Kayan and Kenyah (1950). Another residual category was that of the small nomadic groups of hunter-gatherers referred to usually as either ‘Punan’ or ‘Penan’, though even here there were other nomads like the Bhuket (Ukit) who were referred to by other names and/or did not accept the term ‘Punan’ or ‘Penan’ (see Shanthi Tambiah, 1995). There were still other categories including the Lun Bawang/Lun Dayeh, Kelabit and Bisaya which also did not fit easily into any larger designation. Nevertheless, in post-independent Sarawak the umbrella term ‘Orang Ulu’ (or ‘Upriver People’) has been increasingly adopted by government and by the people themselves to classify this indigenous ethnic mosaic outside the more easily delineated Iban and Bidayuh (Boulanger, 2009: 19-20). As we have seen the grand catch-all term ‘Dayak’ has also entered into public discourse to embrace all indigenes who are not Malay or more broadly not Muslim, though again the term does not demarcate a precisely delineated category.

Therefore, what were once relatively fluid, more localised communities which were not neatly bounded became much more clearly delineated and fixed initially under the Brookes into larger scale categories and groupings which were much more administratively manageable. These were consolidated further during the post-war British colonial period from 1946 until the merger with the Federation of Malaya in 1963 when for census, administrative and development purposes the incoming colonial government required an even more precise, state-wide ethnic classification system (Boulanger, 2009: 40-43). This was also part of a political process of introducing officially ordained racial and ethnic orders which were constitutionally recognised by the post-colonial Malaysian government.

Postill provides an interesting analysis of the development of Radio Sarawak during the colonial period and its effects on ethnic identity with the decision to establish four sections based on language: Malay, Chinese, Iban and English (2006: 46-50). In September 1958 the Borneo Literature Bureau was also founded to publish in the four major language categories with some attention to other indigenous languages as well (ibid: 51-58). This process of ethnic rationalisation, standardisation and simplification was given a further stimulus when political parties were formed in the run up to independence within Malaysia. In Sarawak these also tended to coalesce around emerging ethnic identities (Chinese and Malay-Melanau-Muslim in particular) although they were less clear cut than in Peninsular Malaysia. In fact there was a greater tolerance of multi-ethnic parties and the Ibans in particular joined several different parties dominated by either Chinese or Malay-Melanau-Muslims, even though specifically Dayak parties were also formed (see for example Jayum and King, 2004).

The interesting dimension of ethnic politics in Sarawak following the formation of the Federation of Malaysia was that the dominant model of ethnic relations in Peninsular Malaysia was relatively quickly superimposed on a rather different ethnic mosaic in a marginal state. Malaysian
politicians were as assiduous as their former colonial masters in using ethnicity for their own purposes. In political terms what happened as in the Peninsula was that a Muslim political elite entered into an alliance with and was supported by a subordinate Chinese elite. It turned out that in Sarawak the Dayak access to power and influence was far less than their demographic importance. It was clear from the outset, in spite of the safeguards written into the documents which underpinned the new Federation that ultimately a Muslim hegemony would be established at the expense of viable representation for the Dayak population (King, 1990; Leigh, 1974, 1979). Malay politicians at the centre of power in Kuala Lumpur and with control of the federal apparatus had the means to engineer a suitable political configuration in Sarawak by both direct and indirect intervention in the political, economic and financial affairs of the state. However, what was not predicted was that a minority non-Malay, primarily Muslim group, the Melanau would be able to gain control of the state and establish a ‘dynasty’ which has survived for over 40 years (through the Chief Ministerships of Abdul Rahman Yakub and his nephew Abdul Taib Mahmud). Although the Dayaks, and particularly the Iban, provided the first two Chief Ministers of Sarawak from 1963 to 1970, they have been governed since then by a small group of Muslim Melanau and Malay, and co-opted Dayaks. This situation was made possible by the direct intervention of the ruling elite in Kuala Lumpur in Sarawak affairs and, for example, the removal of the recalcitrant Iban Chief Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan in 1966 and the installation of a ‘puppet’ successor, Tawi Sli as an interim measure until a Muslim Chief Minister could come to power (Boulanger, 2009: 84). For those who govern from Kuala Lumpur, the fact that the ruling dynasty is not Malay has not been a problem. It is after all a Muslim dynasty and has delivered faithfully the necessary support to the ruling coalition (Boulanger, 2009: 71). Rahman Yakub in particular was a strong champion of the Malay language and its use as the medium of instruction in schools (at the expense of the use of English, Iban and Chinese) and of Islam and its importance as a unifying symbol and expression of Malayness (ibid: 75). Although his nephew successor played down the Malay agenda and deliberately sought to appeal to various Dayak constituencies as well as developing a stronger sense of Melanau identity, he too continued to keep the Malay leadership in UMNO happy by delivering majority support to the ruling coalition. Moreover, the political alliance forged by Taib Mahmud promoted the same kind of development-obsessed ideology as federal politicians (Postill, 2006: 92-93). In the event Taib has managed to conduct a delicate political balancing act with the senior politicians in Kuala Lumpur ensuring that he had some room for manoeuvre in Sarawak but recognising that he also had to play a subordinate and supportive role at the federal level.

One of the few studies of urban-based cultural identities in Sarawak is that of Boulanger’s among the non-Malays in Kuching (2009), though there are other valuable studies of urban populations and processes which do not address ethnicity but rather gender and class identities (see, for example, Hew, 2003). In the context of urbanisation and modernisation, Boulanger investigates whether or not identities are being ‘destroyed, renewed, [or] created’ (2009: 84). Interestingly what she found were certain defining features of a Dayak identity which had emerged only in recent times and which still competes with other identities; but it also drew on ethnic stereotypes which had been constructed during the colonial period and then reinforced during political independence. These are not based on specific cultural, linguistic or physical characteristics but rather on perceptions of where those labelled ‘Dayaks’ see themselves as situated in the Sarawak and Malaysian scheme of things and on the attitudes of others towards them. On the negative side
her urban informants saw Dayaks as ‘left behind’ in socio-economic terms as a result of shortcomings within their culture and personality which could be remedied by striving hard and proving oneself; they were ‘second-class bumiputera’ primarily because of the advantages afforded to the Malays and Melanaus through their adherence to Islam and their dominance in political and public life; Dayaks were still considered to be ‘primitive’ by certain members of other ethnic groups. On the positive side urban Dayaks emphasised education, conversion to Christianity, the importance of establishing and celebrating their origins as the truly indigenous people of this part of Malaysia and importantly those traditions expressed in material culture, dance, music, story-telling, myths, sagas, chants and in a robust and cohesive longhouse-based social life which can lay claim to the status of a civilisation or at least a culture which should be valued (ibid: 103-141). However, overall the designation ‘Dayak’, especially for urban, educated people, is seen in ‘instrumentalist’ terms ‘as a political tool lacking in cultural depth’ (Postill, 2006: 44; and see Boulanger, 2000: 54).

The process of presenting and sustaining an identity in an urban environment can be a profoundly ambiguous experience and the statements of Boulanger’s informants demonstrate this in abundance. But her conclusions demonstrate the problem which an ethnically driven agenda presents, usually to minorities but also to those who should be at least capable of representing their ethnic constituencies, but for various reasons seem unable to do so. She says that in the political arena ‘it appears that Dayaks must always be divided against each other, salted out to a variety of parties that are either ineffectual or become dominated by their non-Dayak component’ (ibid: 144). Some of us reached this conclusion many years ago (see Jayum and King, 2004). Given the way in which Malaysia came into being for larger reasons than giving the Dayaks a prominent place in the Federation, it has always seemed that the non-Malay indigenous minorities would struggle to have their voice heard. What the Sarawak case demonstrates is that ethnicity or alternatively cultural identity (and the ways in which it is used politically) is a powerful social force. It gives advantage to some and disadvantage to others even though in this case the advantaged and disadvantaged are classified together as ‘indigenous’, an ethnic category that is given special status and support (and see Chua, 2012: 38-44). But I am well aware that we must not become too preoccupied with division and dominance; there is an argument to be made that there is also a level of tolerance and cooperation in Sarawak: Welyne Jeffrey Jehom reminds us of ‘pluralist tolerance in intermarriages’, ‘tolerance in public places’, and ‘tolerance in cultural and religious festivities’ (2008: 102, 106).

Bornean identities: reorientations

All this is a rather long-winded of saying that, it seems to me, that it is the cultural realm (in the construction and contestation of identities [see Appadurai, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1996] and the relations between identity formation and globalisation), and the discourses which are generated in the interfaces between people and the nation-state on which we need to focus. There are three points that need to be made in relation to these issues in Borneo and the ways in which Borneo specialists have positioned or have failed to position themselves in regional studies. First, I have long held the view up to the 1990s that Borneo specialists tended to conform to the boundaries that had been set by the colonial powers; we worked either in the former British dependencies or in former Dutch Borneo. We usually did not cross borders; even those who studied in Sarawak or
Sabah or Brunei did not as a rule move across these states. This territorial confinement has presented major problems in understanding cultural identities and historical interconnections which cut across artificially created imperial borders. For example, although a generally excellent study of Sarawak Iban religion, Erik Jensen’s monograph (1974) would have benefitted from attention to the Dutch literature on the Iban-related peoples of West Kalimantan (see King, 1978); even the work of my former research student Traude Gavin on Sarawak Iban ritual cloths (2004) would have been given interesting new dimensions had she been able to visit and include Iban-related communities south of the border, something which she has been remedying more recently. There wasn’t a great deal of research that took a boldly comparative and relational perspective across the whole island or major parts of it up to about 1990, though I have always been prepared to single out the work of Jérôme Rousseau (1990) and Bernard Sellato (1994) as pioneers in this field of endeavour. I tried to do the same broad sweep in the co-authored book with Jan Avé (1986) and in the general book on *The Peoples of Borneo* (1993a). I recognise the inadequacies of those publications, but it was important to move across borders. What has happened in the last two decades is a rapidly increasing amount of work on Kalimantan, which was certainly not the case in the 1970s and the 1980s. This has helped us in understanding more about both historical connections between populations in Borneo but also about the formation and transformation of identities across artificial divides.
Secondly, once we have begun to grasp the complexities of Borneo history, cultures and identities we can then locate the island within the nation-states which incorporate it (though Brunei is an exception here). I have felt for some time that the study of Borneo identities, unless it is content to lapse into a kind of parochialism, needs to address the connections between Kalimantan and the wider Republic of Indonesia and the policies of the central government in relation to its outer island dependencies; and in the Malaysian Borneo territories to examine much more assiduously the consequences for identities in Sarawak and Sabah of the policies and practices of those who control and administer the state in Kuala Lumpur and Putra Jaya and who organise patronage systems within Kuching and Kota Kinabalu.

Thirdly, apart from the work of political scientists and economists which has connected Borneo to the two nation-states with which the major parts of the island are connected, there has been an interesting turn more recently in studies of identities in Borneo. There are four strands to this (though a rather more intense review of the literature might find others). One has comprised the movement from a preoccupation with a defined population to a perspective which sees this population in relation to the nation-state and dominant groups through which it has to negotiate its identity and resources. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s work on the Meratus Dayaks is an early and fine example of this approach (1993; and see also Winzeler [1997a, 1997b] and Sillander [2004]). A second strand has taken the media route to nation-building and asked the question ‘How are populations in Borneo responding to media-generated nation-building in Malaysia and Indonesia?’ Research in the field of media anthropology by John Postill (2006), Fausto Barlocco (2008) and Poline Bala (2007) has explored these dimensions of identity formation. A third has examined Indonesian border populations and the responses of these territorially marginal communities to the pressures of a perceived remote central government (which is seen as dominated by culturally and ethnically different populations with different cultural and ethnic priorities); the work of Eilenberg and Wadley (2009) is important here. Work on the Sarawak side of the border has also focused on territorially marginal populations and their ambiguous and shifting relations with the nation-state (see Ishikawa, 2010; Bala, 2002; and Reid, 1997). Finally, there is an emerging, though still rather nominal interest in identity construction in urban areas and the lifestyles of an expanding middle class. All four strands have, in one way or another, tackled issues of identity and change.

Identities and Ethnicities: some case material

Let us move on to consider what has been achieved in the last couple of decades. Are their significant moments in the study of identity/identities in Borneo? We might say that any study of communities in Borneo has to address the issue of ethnicity and identity, but we have evidence of intense preoccupation in some endeavours and in others something approaching indifference. We have the well known four-volume collection as a special issue of the Sarawak Museum Journal (1989) arising from a 1988 conference in Kuching and a series of ethnic-based seminars around the country to demonstrate the importance of ethnic identities in Sarawak and how they might be managed and transformed. The Cultural Heritage Symposia gained a momentum and have
resulted in five events (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2009) which have brought together representatives from the officially sanctioned ethnic categories in Sarawak (Chua, 2012: 48). The inaugural event was a monumental enterprise and one which, in my view, emphasised the importance of ethnicity and identity in both academic research and in government policy. But very few of the deliberations at that gathering gave explicit attention to the ways in which social transformations are thought about, discussed, and debated within and between the different constituent ethnic groups of Sarawak and in relation to representations generated at higher levels of the nation-state and beyond. This is hardly surprising in that the cultural heritage seminars to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Sarawak’s independence within Malaysia, were designed to encourage ‘the various communities…to examine their respective cultures…to examine their respective cultures to determine what to discard in the interest of “development” and “unity” and what to preserve and incorporate into a national (Malaysian) culture’ (Winzeler, 1997c: 201; Chin and Kedit, 1989). Here we have an apt illustration of what inspires my current deliberations, in that culture and identity are constructed and subject to the demands and interests of the nation-state. Indeed the Sarawak government delineated those ‘ethnic divisions’ which would debate their future roles in the state: Bidayuh, Iban, Melanau, Orang Ulu, Malay, Chinese and Indian.

There also seems to have been little attention to these concerns in the four-volume proceedings arising from the sixth biennial conference of the Borneo Research Council in Kuching in 2000, although there was considerable attention paid to issues of ethnicity and culture (Leigh, 2000). However, the appearance since the 1990s of several studies scattered across Borneo which examine the responses of local populations to the policies and practices of state representatives and those with power and influence enables us to draw out similarities and differences in those responses and discourses. These emerging interests have now been consolidated and brought together in the Borneo Research Council’s 11th international conference in Brunei in the themes of ‘Identities, Cultures, Environments’. Some of the key variables in explaining differences in responses and discourses appear to be: (1) the time frame and changes in government and its policies; (2) location of the communities under study (whether close to urban centres or more distant, whether near an international border or not, whether some members of an identified group live and work in an urban area or not); (3) the character and history of inter-ethnic relationships: (4) local economic structures and resource use; (5) demography and population profiles; (6) and relative physical mobility of both men and women.

I am also still attracted to the concept of ‘centres and margins’ (and the populations associated with them) and the related notion that, depending on scale, centres can also be margins, and margins can respond to and negotiate with different centres. Nor should we assume that centres and margins are homogeneous; they are characterised by differences in for example social class, gender and ethnicity. Ideally, research should also examine, not simply the perspectives from the bottom or the margins but also from the top and the centres.

The Nation-state, Majorities and Minorities

One of the first major studies of the effects of national policies and the actions and attitudes of a lowland majority on a minority community and the local responses to these pressures was undertaken not in Sarawak (where one might have anticipated an earlier interest) but in
Kalimantan. Interest in local identities in the context of a nation-state was marked above all by the appearance of Anna Tsing’s splendid study *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen* which examined the ‘cultural and political construction of marginality’ (1993:5). I should add here that, although I combine the concept of nation with that of state, I recognise that they are conceptually distinct and in certain cases may not cohere. Tsing’s study demonstrates how the Meratus Dayaks (an exonym for those diverse indigenous populations which live in the Meratus Uplands) of South Kalimantan are marginalised not only by the policies and practices of the state but also by their neighbours, the lowland Banjar Malays, and how the Meratus challenge, negotiate, reinterpret and explain their lowly status. I should add that subsequently Mary Hawkins has examined the Banjar side of the story and demonstrated that their dominance as a Muslim community has not only generated marginality among minority groups but has also encouraged members of upland communities to assimilate to the ethnic category ‘Banjar’ (2000: 24-36).

We are familiar with Tsing’s perspectives from other studies of outer islanders in Indonesia, and, of course, in the work of James Scott on ‘weapons of the weak’ (1985) and ‘the art of not being governed’ (2009), but, to my knowledge, this is the first detailed and sustained attempt in a Borneo context to analyse the interrelationships between the discourses and practices associated with civilisation, modernity, progress, order and power on the one hand and the primitive, traditional, backward, nomadic, disordered, untamed and displaced on the other. During the past couple of decades there have been several other studies of different Borneo populations examining how both colonial and post-colonial actions have served to divide populations off from each other and create separate, marginal populations and how these in turn talk about and represent state power. In the case of the Meratus under Suharto’s New Order this representation of the state was expressed and identified in terms of violence, terrorism, government ‘head-hunting’, ceremonial building projects in the name of development and the political preoccupation with establishing ‘order’ (ibid: 76ff). I would also link the detailed work of Kenneth Sillander on the Bentian Dayaks of East Kalimantan with that of Tsing (as Sillander does himself), in that he examines some of the consequences of being on the margins or on ‘several peripheries’ (2004:48ff). However, he does state from the outset that, although originally he had planned ‘to make a study of ethnicity’, he then found that he was unable to gather sufficient data on this topic mainly because ‘of the relative insignificance of ethnic identity and ethnicity as criteria for social action among the Bentian’ (2004: 3; 1995). Even so Sillander does provide us with the kind of information and analysis which suggests to me that we can situate the Bentian within the literature on ‘centres’ and ‘margins’ and on the processes of constructing marginal identities in interaction with powerful centres. In this connection in explaining the construction of the Bentian as a recognisable unit of identification Sillander says

> it was this exonymic usage of the term “Bentian” which gave rise to the remembered early Bentian use of the term in the wider sense during downriver tributary visits. Thus it seems that it was through external influence resulting from increasing regional integration that a more general identification with the term gradually developed, an assumption given further support by the more recently developing importance of a general Bentian identity which has followed the establishment of the subdistrict of Bentian Besar in the postcolonial period (2004:32).
In my view Sillander has much more to tell us about Bentian identity than he reveals in his thesis, although even there he devotes a considerable amount of attention to the question of ‘Who are the Bentian?’ (ibid: 25-108).

We have also seen, in the case of the Punan/Penan of Sarawak, a case to which Tsing refers, how the media and other external observers including politicians, government agents, and NGO activists (and even anthropologists) choose to represent and ‘construct’ these ‘out-of-the-way’ peoples in the context of commercial logging and the undermining of a nomadic way of life (see for example Bending [2006]; and for a review King [2006]; and Brosius, 2007; and Thambiah, 1995). A major recent study which focuses on the ‘images’ and identities of the Punan Malinau in East Kalimantan is that by Lars Kaskija (2012); building on the work of Sellato (1994), Thambiah (1995) and others he develops notions of Punan identity in their engagement with more powerful neighbours on the bases of a foraging ethos, openness, sociality, flexibility and opportunism, immediate return and sharing, variability and diversity, and ‘code-switching’. Kaskija’s findings and his characterisation of the Punan as ‘stuck at the bottom’ and as adopting strategies to engage with dominant others reminds me very much of Tsing’s observations on the Meratus. But in the case of the Punan Malinau there is interaction with and response to several dominant others and not just one as in Meratus-Banjar relations.

Another very important development in the Tsing theme is Robert Winzeler’s edited book (1997a) which examines the encounters between the post-colonial state and minority groups and the range of local responses to external pressures, which ‘have often involved a mixture of dependency and acceptance, on the one hand, and of hostility and resistance, on the other’ (1997b: 2). Winzeler’s book is something of a bold departure in Borneo studies in that it embraces the Malaysian Peninsula, and Malaysian and Indonesian Borneo. What he also draws our attention to is the increasingly interventionist policies of the post-colonial state in comparison with the colonial experience in that

\[\text{[t]he national policies and projects carried out by postcolonial governments in regard to the indigenous peoples involve efforts at social and cultural transformation……[they] generally seek to promote a common national culture, religion, and language and to eradicate what are regarded as backward or savage beliefs, customs, lifestyles, and modes of adaptation (1997b: 1-2).}\]

Winzeler identifies the indigenous responses to these interventions in predictable fashion: ‘dependency and acceptance’, ‘hostility and resistance’, ‘peaceful protest’, ‘accepted forums’, ‘passive noncooperation’, ‘sabotage’, and ‘open rebellion’ (ibid:2-3). The consequences for identity are clear; in situations of pressure, tension and conflict minorities have a different attitude to their ‘cultural patterns and traditions’ in that what was previously ‘implicit’ have become ‘objectified or externalized’ (ibid: 3). Winzeler explores some of these issues in relation to the Bidayuh, and in noting their much more intense relations with those in power because of their proximity to Kuching (the Brunei Malays, the Brooke Raj, the British colonial regime and the representatives of the post-colonial Malaysian federal authorities in Kuala Lumpur and their agents in Kuching) Winzeler remarks that the Bidayuh are ‘involved in the creative cultural process of maintaining, restoring, discovering, and, in some instances, creating traditions’ (ibid: 216). They
have done so, among other agencies, through the Dayak Bidayuh National Association which had been concerned both to modernise the Bidayuh and to retain the core elements of Bidayuh identity and tradition which include the men’s house (ibid: 222-223). It is above all about identity, but as Winzeler notes it is part of an overall process of ‘cultural objectification’ in Malaysia following the need for the government to formulate a national cultural policy in order to promote national unity and identity (ibid: 225-226). In order to survive cultures (and in this regard identities) have to be formalised and promoted, and this is especially pressing for those populations under threat, particularly the Bidayuh, and their need to overcome the construction of the Bidayuh in the colonial and early anthropological literature as passive victims of modernisation and the aggression of others (ibid: 227).

There is another stream of work which addresses religious conversion and which might be placed in this section, though it could well deserve a category of its own. Clearly conversion to a particular religion is also implicated in political processes and nation-building. Conversion in the Borneo territories is invariably to one of the world religions, particularly Islam (see, for example, Chalmers, 2006 and Asiyah, 2011) and various forms of Christianity (Chua, 2012), or in parts of central and south-eastern Kalimantan to the Dayak religion referred to as Kaharingan which is recognised by the Indonesian government as an official religion and categorised as a version of Hinduism (Schiller, 1997). The indigenous religion of the Ngaju has been codified and its ritual standardised in the process of gaining acceptance as an official religion. It is also deployed by the Ngaju and others as a central element in their identity and their claims to modernity in the Indonesian nation-state. Schiller’s study provides a template for many of the main issues to be considered in conversion processes: embracing modernisation, embracing modernisation but without converting to the majority religion, embracing modernity by converting to an officially recognised religion.
Two studies of the Bidayuh in Sarawak have also, among other things, explored the relationship between conversion and identity (Chua, 2009, 2012; Harris, 2002), and Winzeler who has examined processes of identity change among the Bidayuh, has also considered conversion among minority populations more generally in Southeast Asia, and the economic and material, magical and spiritual, and the ethnic and identity reasons for it (2008; and see Winzeler for material expressions of religion and its transformations [2004]). Clearly culture has been subject to increasing essentialisation or objectification in Sarawak in the context of the political imperative to promote multiculturalism. Yet, as Chua argues, we should not be so seduced by the political dimensions of conversion, though I would argue that this is a vitally important element of what we are witnessing in Borneo and throughout Southeast Asia, but instead we must approach the issue of ‘cultural consciousness’ from the perspective of those we study who ‘not only act in the world but also contemplate, speculate about, and debate various notions about which anthropologists are also concerned – such as “culture”, “religion”, “(dis)continuity” and “Christianity”’ (2012: 29). What is clear is that conversion to Christianity enables Bidayuhs to continue to connect with their past and to claim through Christianity a Bidayuh identity. Chua’s work in particular, also draws our attention to the issue of whether or not conversion requires and results in ‘rupture’ with the past in the realisation of a new set of ritual practices, and, perhaps for some, a new spirituality, or
whether there is the possibility of a continuing connection with the old religion. With some notable exceptions she proposes that there is continuity and that gawai adat is still connected and, for some, meaningful to the religious lives of the Bidayuh. Chua says with great conviction that religious conversion ‘did not only generate discourses of change and difference, but also gave rise to a strong, and in many ways, more pervasive, sense of connection with the past: of continuity and contiguity between adat gawai and Christianity (ibid: 104).

It is also worth reference in this section that there are other major pieces of work which I have not yet been able to access, read and digest, but the titles look enticing and suggest that they fall within my interest in the relationships between ethnicity and the state. Among others they comprise Laura Steckman’s thesis on the formation of Dayak identity in Kalimantan and the role of the state in this process (2011) and Johannes Kustanto’s work on the politics of ethnic identity among the Sungkung of West Kalimantan (2002).

The Media, Identities and Nation-building

Let us move on to the developing interest in the media which in turn focuses on ‘agency from below’, whether in national terms it is a positive or a negative response. Anderson’s excursion into the mechanisms of nation-creation – print media, census, map and museum- in the period of early modernity, has to be augmented by attention to the effects of diverse forms of electronic and print media in the era of late-modernity (1991). One of the few researchers to address this subject
Following John Comaroff (1996), Postill, though critical of some of Comaroff’s propositions, addresses the phenomenon of global communications and the ways in which global cultural flows generate reactions and mediations on the part of the representatives of the state and responses on the part of constituent ethnic groups (like the Iban) in the arena of cultural politics and identity construction and change (2001: 147; and see 1998, 2008). Postill carefully and subtly examines
historically different media forms (literature [including school texts and indigenous language publications], radio, television) during the post-war period in Sarawak and tries to determine to what extent and in what ways the Sarawak state and Malaysian national governments have been able to manage and control media productions (through mass education and a national language policy as well as the control of certain information sources) in order to build a national culture, and how their actions have impacted on the development and transformation of Iban identity (2001: 148).

In particular, the dissemination of cultural information, bearing in mind the distinction between oral and written forms of information and between oral and literate traditions, has generated tensions among minority groups to both modernise and retain their identities based selectively on elements of past traditions. In this process identity is both constructed and transformed and re-invented but the vital issue is whether or not minority languages are permitted in written and other forms through, for example, school instruction and newspapers. In the era of interpersonal communication, particularly the internet and email, these devices which enable criticism and resistance, become even more important when other major outlets of information are government-controlled. Postill’s main conclusion with which I fully concur is that there is a need ‘to understand ethnicity not as an isolated category of analysis but as part of a broader context of social, economic, and political relations’ (2002: 118). His significant contribution is to investigate the diverse modes in which information, ideology and forms of knowledge are conveyed and how these in turn are incorporated, changed and responded to by individuals and communities in constructing and transforming their identities. He also asserts that through media-disseminated nation-building ‘Malaysia has become an unquestioned reality amongst the Iban of Sarawak’ as has their participation in ‘mass public culture’ (2006: 192-193). Even more positively, though this might be contentious if we wish to encompass all Iban in Sarawak, he asserts that ‘state-led media efforts have been amply rewarded for the Iban of Sarawak have become thoroughly “Malaysianised”’ (2006:3). This, of course, depends on what we understand by the concept of Malaysia and its relationship to development and modernity (for example is it primarily in cultural terms or political-territorial terms?).

Media-generated nation-building in Malaysia seems to have produced a different result among the Kadazandusun in the other Malaysian Borneo state of Sabah, which demonstrates that, according to context, state propaganda can have both positive and negative effects. Fausto Barlocco examines the encounters between members of a local community of Kadazandusun in the village of Kituau in the Penampang region of Sabah and the Muslim-Malay-dominated federal authorities in Kuala Lumpur and their surrogates in Kota Kinabalu (2008, 2009, 2010). Certain observations are extended to the wider Kadazandusun population. The specific focus is on the ways in which Kadazandusun identities have been constructed and transformed and the situational manipulations of identities in the context of the post-independence Malaysian nation-building project. In this regard, and as with Postill’s study, a major area of interest is the use of the media by the representatives of the state in presenting its images and visions of the nation and the ‘national culture’ and the problems and issues which this presents for a marginalised Kadazandusun minority. The analysis of the practices and discourses surrounding identity formation and change and resistance to state-generated priorities leads Barlocco to address some of the general and
Southeast Asian-specific literature on ethnicity, identity, modernity, ‘the invention of tradition’, ‘imagined communities’, and the media and consumption.

Barlocco focuses on the sense of belonging of the Kadazandusun and on two major kinds of collective identification: the nation and the ethnic group. In contrast to the Iban of Postill’s study Kadazandusun villagers usually reject the state’s promotion of a national identity and are unwilling to identify with the Malaysian nation. They more often identify themselves as members of their ethnic group or village which, in Kadazandusun eyes, enable greater participation than at the national level. Yet the Malaysian nation-building project is profoundly ambiguous: it seeks to promote a national culture and identity whilst at the same time differentiating its citizens into separate ethnic categories and treating them differently. In this situation (though it conforms to what we know about the situational operation of identities in other cases) is that Kadazandusun villagers identify themselves as Malaysian, Kadazan, Sabahan and members of their village according to the context. Nevertheless, they feel themselves to be a marginalised population and their sense of belonging is rooted at the local rather than the national level. Barlocco argues that the official state discourse and practice of ethnic and religious differentiation has been deeply internalised by the Kadazan and is a primary reason for their opposition to the state, because of their experience of being treated as marginal and second-class citizens.

A similar experience is recorded for the Bidayuh. Chua gives us considerable evidence that the Bidayuh, whilst embracing modernity and wishing to benefit from it, are, in an important sense, ambivalent about it. She, like Postill in the Iban case, confirms that the Bidayuh are ‘part of the wider Malaysian nation’. But, in contrast to Postill’s conclusions, she proposes that this process of constructing a nation in Malay terms ‘has certainly generated a widespread sense of alienation from its institutions and the powers-that-be’ and for the Bidayuh have led to their realisation that modernisation and development has become ‘inescapably ethnicized’ (2012: 42-43).

In another rather different study of nation-building and of the process of drawing minority populations into the national fold, Poline Bala has examined the processes and consequences of the introduction of the e-Bario development programme (Information Communication Technologies, comprising telephones, computers, Very Small Aperture terminals (VSATs) and the internet) in the Kelabit Highlands from the year 2000. Bala was herself engaged in the implementation and monitoring of the programme and she explores various issues to do with local responses to state-generated development, and the opportunities, tensions and constraints surrounding action anthropology. Bala’s recurring theme is that in contrast to the critical positions taken by a number of prominent and distinguished social scientists on the dimensions of power, control, hegemony, exploitation, marginalisation and dependency in development discourse and action (notably in the work of Arturo Escobar, 1995), in the Kelabit case there is a more optimistic story to tell. Bala argues that, during several decades of exposure to the outside world both during the late colonial period and the period of independence within Malaysia, the Kelabit have engaged in a positive quest for development and progress and a desire to embrace modernity. Development is seen in local cultural terms as a resource, a product to be consumed and used. They embraced Christianity, formal education, and opportunities in the world beyond their homeland in the remote uplands, but in a later paper Bala is a little more equivocal and studied in examining some of the problems and issues which will face the Kelabit as a Christian minority in Malaysia (2008: 42-43).
Nevertheless, overall Kelabit are depicted as makers of their own futures: problem-solvers and decision-makers, who observe, learn, evaluate and make choices, though, of course, within certain parameters. The Kelabit search for status, success, affluence and respect, the means of acquiring these qualities and the meanings attached to them have changed with the increasing engagement of the Kelabit with the outside world. Nevertheless, there does appear to be areas of change in which the Kelabit are rather more powerless: the threats posed by commercial logging and by the pressures on land and native land rights, and in broader political terms the exercise of power by a Malay-dominated federation, and, in Sarawak, a Melanau-Malay-dominated state which categorises marginal minorities as ‘other indigenous’ or ‘orang ulu’, and ensures that the main benefits of economic development do not go to them. We know that there are successful, prominent, and outward-looking Kelabit, but we have to ask what power and influence do they wield? Nevertheless, as with Postill’s Iban study the Kelabit, through their access to media and in this case their use of modern electronic technology, appear to be embracing modernity and the national agenda.

**Borderlands, Margins and Nation-states**

We all recognise that territorial borders, as artificial political constructs determining sovereignty, citizenship and the reach of state laws and jurisdiction, are not necessarily impermeable or even necessarily formidable barriers to movement. This is especially so in the case of the border between Indonesian Kalimantan and Malaysian Borneo. Nevertheless, borders define states and, depending on the capacities of central governments to monitor, police and secure their borders then they can and do make a difference. Noboru Ishikawa’s path-breaking study of the borderland Malay community of Telok Melano in the Lundu district of Sarawak explores how nation-states are made and sustained and how those who live at or near borders ‘deal with the most concrete manifestation of the nation-state – its territorial boundary’ (2010: 4-5). It demonstrates, in extended historical perspective, how the occupation, deployment and symbolism of space and human movement across it are interrelated with the formation, maintenance and transformation of different interrelated levels of identity – national, ethnic, and community/village. What is especially important about the study is the way in which the focus moves from understanding the activities of the nation-state (and the problematical connection between ‘nation’ and ‘state’) not simply in terms of incorporating people and space, forging an identity which transcends the local, and instilling a sense of belonging but also for those at the borders how these larger activities also produce social dislocation, ethnic displacement, marginalisation, heterogeneity and unevenness. It shows too how trans-national movements both serve to strengthen and undermine the national project.
Eilenberg’s work (2012) and his jointly written papers with Wadley (Eilenberg and Wadley, 2009; Wadley and Eilenberg, 2006) must be read in conjunction with Ishikawa’s study. Operating at a different section of the border and on the Indonesian side, focusing on the Iban of the Emperan (or the former Dutch-named ‘Batang-Loepar-landen’) their work serves both to confirm some of Ishikawa’s findings and perspectives and to take this field of research into different directions. Eilenberg demonstrates, as does Ishikawa, the porosity of the border between Sarawak and West Kalimantan. However, he considers the increasingly strengthened position of what he terms the ‘border elite’ in West Kalimantan, particularly since the post-Suharto government’s policy of decentralisation and the decision to grant more autonomy to the regions, as well as the political, cultural and psychological distance which these Indonesian border populations, in this case the Ibans, feel towards not only Jakarta but also the provincial capital of Pontianak. Experiencing this sense of marginalisation, their orientation is across the border to Sarawak and their Iban kin, friends and ethnic cousins where they frequently go to visit and work, and where some also settle permanently. In other words, rather than seeing themselves as citizens of an Indonesian nation-state, the Indonesian Iban feel closer, as do the Kadazandusun in Sabah, to those who share a particular ethnic identity (even though this too has been
constructed by political centres). But the interesting dimension to this issue in West Kalimantan is that the core of Iban ethnic identity is found across a national border and not as in the Kadazandusun case in easy reach of the state capital. Eilenberg says, ‘For many, their connections over the border are often stronger than those with their own nation’ (2012: 23). This leaves open, however, the question of what their orientation was and is to the Sarawak state and the Kuala Lumpur federal government.

Although in a rather different context looking across the border from Sarawak to Kalimantan, Poline Bala also emphasises the importance of the social, cultural and historical connectedness between the Kelabit and the Lun Berian, their close relatives (lun ruyung) on the other side of the border (2002; and see Amster, 2006: 218). However, in this sector of the border it would appear that this political and territorial demarcation has made a real difference in that, despite cross-border relationships these have been distanced over time and that the perceptions of the border and the people who live on the other side have changed so that there is an emerging differentiation of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This was especially strengthened during Sukarno’s ‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia in the early 1960s when borders hardened and made a difference. This set of findings is also supported by Matthew Amster’s work on the Kelabit when he proposes that they have ‘a positive understanding of the relationship to the nation and state’ (2006: 222). In Eilenberg’s, Bala’s and Amster’s studies there is also a sense of the economic and status
differentiation between those who live on either side of the border; Malaysians are more wealthy, and in Sarawak have greater freedom of cultural expression. Indonesians cross the border to find work where they can, usually in menial jobs. Nevertheless, the cross-border perspectives and interactions which are active and ongoing do make a difference to the efforts of political elites at the centre to build a nation and national consciousness. They also encourage us to re-conceptualise the nature of the state and the nation, and to engage with the nation-state as both an idea and as everyday practices (Eilenberg, 2012: 50).

This important and emerging literature on the issues posed for nation-states and by its populations at the margins, engendered by the inevitable existence of borderlands, draws attention, among other things, to the importance of the relationship between territory and identity and the process of colonising space. It is at the margins that the arrangement and demarcation of space takes on a particular resonance. Though I shall not discuss this in much more detail here (I am still in the process of assimilating it) there is an interesting body of work, perhaps deserving the status of another strand in my case-studies, which has examined the construction and demarcation of identities through state action, the politicisation of identities and the association of identities with particular territories. Nancy Lee Peluso examines this dimension of ethnicity in her subtle analysis of the Dayak-Madurese conflicts in West Kalimantan in 1996-97 (2008; and see Davidson, 2008), which also builds on the work of Emily Harwell (2000; and see Peluso and Harwell [2001]). It is clear that there was a relationship between violence and identity but Peluso also suggests that ‘[b]ecause ethnicity or “race” was the basis by which territory, authority, and land rights were allocated under Dutch colonial legal pluralism, territory and ethnicity had become conjoined in new and unprecedented ways, most importantly in the ways individuals were allowed access to land or governed (2008: 56). Ethnic differences were the product of colonial and post-colonial policies and actions, and cultural identities were the subject of more recent government attention to ‘revitalise and reconfigure “culture”’ (ibid) which in turn served to give form and substance to a wider Dayak identity (ibid: 64). A recent doctoral thesis on the cultural dimensions of Dayak-Madurese violence in West Kalimantan also explores, among other things, the construction and development of a pan-Dayak identity (König, 2012).

Emerging Middle Classes and Lifestyles

This vital concern with identity construction and transformation is especially important at a time when there has been the growth of a multi-ethnic, disparate young middle class in Borneo and the wider Malaysia and Indonesia (and indeed Brunei) - educated, urban-based, consumerist - and notable evidence of the development of civil society. Junaenah Sulehan and Madeline Berma have made reference to these young professionals and consumerism in Sarawak for example without specifically analysing the phenomenon (1999: 68-71). In this connection I am thinking of the valuable work of such researchers as Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (1992; and see Kahn, 1995, 1998; Abdul Rahman
Rungus tour guides, Kudat (2012); again on the author’s one-day outing from a cruise ship

Embong, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002, 2006a, 2006b; and see King et al, 2008) in Peninsular Malaysia and Loh in relation to the Kadazan of Sabah (1992) which might serve as an appropriate model for Sarawak. Maznah and Wong have also contributed to this agenda (2001a, 2001b), and Zawawi Ibrahim and his contributors, in his edited book on Sarawak multiculturalism, also acknowledge the importance of this field of research in cultural politics and the politics of identity (2008a, 2008b). They have managed to push this agenda forward, but much more needs to be done in the Sarawak (and Sabah) context on the study of identities in changing class situations in Malaysian Borneo. Even more needs to be done in Kalimantan.

One might also expect that concerns about globalisation would surface most directly in studies of urbanisation in Borneo where local people experience some of the most immediate manifestations of global processes and late modernity, through encounters with the state and bureaucracy, nation-building symbols and actions, the media, technology and consumerism, international tourists, and representatives of other ethnic groups. However, attention to the urban context in Borneo has not been substantial. Among the most important studies have been Lockard’s social and economic history of Kuching (1987), Sutlive’s anthropological work on Rejang Iban migration to Sibu (1972, 1977), and Hew’s focus on female migration and women’s circumstances in urban settings (2001, 2003, 2007a, 2007b). However, even these studies were done without any explicit attention to identity formation. One researcher who does attempt, to my mind, to situate her work in the arena of identities and culture is Boulanger (which I have summarised earlier) with her interest in changing Dayak urban identities and the implications of modernity and ‘being modern’ for the identification with and conceptualisation of Dayak traditions and religion, distinctions between the present (the future) and the past, between the urban and the rural, and between urban and rural representatives of different Dayak ethnic categories and groups (2000, 2008). She also identifies
three dimensions of modernity among urban Dayaks: Christianity, education and entrepreneurship (1999). Here we return to the theme of identity through religion, but also the importance of being modern (moden) (see, for example, Chua, 2012: 40-44).

Conclusions

The relationship between culture and identity and the potential which a focus on the concept of identities in motion has in the development of research on Borneo, and particularly comparative research is significant, I would argue. The conceptualisation of at least some of the relations in a Borneo context in terms of ‘centres’ and ‘margins’ or alternatively ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’ may also be of some analytical value. In a similar vein Ishikawa has said, in relation to his study of a Malay borderland community in Sarawak, that ‘The emergence of a centre-periphery relationship in the making of the geo-body of the territorial state has been a crucial factor for the uneven expansion of national life’ (2010: 92; 135-137). We can examine these relations in spatial terms (or rather in terms of the occupation, consolidation, construction and symbolism of space) or in terms of cultural hierarchies or layers (nations, ethnic categories and groups, local communities and so on), and their relationships to power and wealth, keeping in mind that these layers in relation to centres and margins

are also relative. In other words, margins have different orders of magnitude from relatively remote minority groups to larger urban populations so that for certain purposes residents of Kuching can be seen as marginal or peripheral to those of Kuala Lumpur. In admittedly rather
crude terms I also posed the question some time ago of why the state of Sarawak has been ‘peripheral’ to the powerful centres of Peninsular Malaysia (King, 1990: 110-129).

In this connection we have an expanding literature on marginal or peripheral populations and identity construction and transformation among minorities in Borneo. But in certain respects, and, as I and my co-editor Michael Parnwell argued a couple of decades ago in a book on ‘margins’ and ‘minorities’ in Malaysia, ‘there is often an ethnic, and specifically a cultural dimension to the feature of marginality …[so that] ….uneven development also comes to be expressed in cultural terms’ (1990: 2-3). In a very similar vein Joel Kahn, in his analysis of the relations between uplands and lowlands, core and periphery, the powerful and the marginal, and the rich and the poor in Indonesia draws attention to the state-generated process of ‘culturalising’ relationships in Suharto’s Indonesia which might otherwise be thought of in terms of unequal access to resources or unequal access to power and wealth (1999).

Perhaps the comparative study of cultural identities across Borneo, taking in the range of cases and circumstances to be found in different locations and political units, might prove rewarding in not only continuing to bring the wider perspective which the field of Borneo Studies should provide for the study of the whole island but also to bring the wider nation-states within which the major areas of Borneo are situated into our frames of analysis.
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